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This paper addresses issues related to the development agenda deliberations initiated by a group of de-
veloping countries at the WIPO General Assembly in September 2004. It is a compilation of the principal 
papers submitted to a Dialogue facilitated by ICTSD on 20 November 2006 in Nyon, Switzerland. They 
were commissioned by ICTSD to stimulate a debate and exchange of ideas among Geneva-based diplo-
mats around the development agenda initiative. 
At the request of those familiar with the 20 November 2006 Dialogue, ICTSD has decided to publish these 
notes, revised by their authors for external publication, for the benefit of all those interested in the 
intense debate taking place in Geneva on the future of the WIPO development agenda. It is one further 
contribution of the ICTSD Programme on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) Sustainable Development to 
a better understanding of the relationship between intellectual property and development and of the 
general challenges faced by the intellectual property system in the 21st century. 
The general premise of ICTSD’s work in this field is that the controversial nature of intellectual property 
regimes (patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, integrated circuits and geographical indica-
tions) has a bearing on issues as diverse as access to public health, knowledge, food security, traditional 
knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the development of the Internet, and the future of the entertain-
ment and media industries – and necessitates a research-based and objective analysis which explains recent 
legislative trends and the intensification of international harmonisation of IPRs. There is a continuous need, 
particularly for developing countries, in an increasingly knowledge-based economy, to have a better under-
standing of developments in IPRs and their implications, challenges and opportunities.
Empirical evidence as to the role of IP protection in promoting innovation and growth remains inconclu-
sive. Diverging views also persist on the impacts of IPRs on development prospects. It is urgent, there-
fore, to continue reflecting on questions such as: How can developing countries use IP tools to advance 
their development strategy?  What are the key concerns surrounding the issues of IPRs for developing 
countries? What are the specific difficulties they face in intellectual property negotiations at different 
levels? Is intellectual property directly relevant to sustainable development and to the achievement of 
agreed international development goals? How we can facilitate technological flows among all countries? 
Do they have the capacity, especially the least developed among them, to formulate their negotiating 
positions and become well-informed negotiating partners? These are essential questions that policy mak-
ers need to address in order to design IP laws and policies that best meet the needs of their constituents 
and negotiate effectively in future agreements. These are the broad issues under discussion in the delib-
erations in WIPO on a development agenda to which this paper intends to contribute.
To address some of these questions, the ICTSD Programme on Intellectual Property and Sustainable 
Development was launched in July 2000. One central objective has been to facilitate the emergence of 
a critical mass of well-informed stakeholders in developing countries – including decision makers and 
negotiators, but also the private sector and civil society – who will be able to define their own sustain-
able human development objectives in the field of IPRs and effectively advance them at the national and 
international levels. 
We hope you will find this compilation a useful contribution to the debate on intellectual property and 
sustainable development and particularly to the establishment, on strong grounds, of an IP development 
agenda in the context of the work of WIPO.
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz 
Chief Executive, ICTSD
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InTRoDuCTIon
Intellectual Property (IP) systems have existed 
for decades, in some instances even centuries, 
with the underlying purpose of promoting social 
welfare through the stimulation of innovation, 
research and creativity. It is, therefore, striking 
that one of the most distinctive features of IP 
regimes, compared to other policy areas, has been 
their relative isolation from more general public 
interest debates. It is only in the last decade that 
IPRs have emerged in discussions and debates on 
topics as diverse as public health, food security, 
education, trade, industrial policy, traditional 
knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the Inter-
net, the entertainment and media industries, and 
on the role of IP in a knowledge-based economy. 
A second relevant feature is that the IP arena today 
is one of the most dynamic areas of international 
law. Beyond the TRIPS Agreement, new deals are 
being struck at the international, regional and 
bilateral levels that build on and strengthen the 
minimum standards established by TRIPS. There 
is a common tendency in these agreements to: 
expand the scope of information, ideas and prod-
ucts that are subject to IP protection; create new 
rights for the generators of IP; and, standardise 
the basic features of IPRs. Consequently, national 
IPR regimes throughout the world are facing 
increasing levels of pressure to harmonise their 
laws in line with those of technologically more 
advanced countries. 
Thirdly, there are changes in the number and na-
ture of institutions dealing with these matters. 
Today, a number of intergovernmental bodies 
beyond the WTO and WIPO include IP-related 
questions in their work programmes, as in the 
cases of the WHO, UNESCO, FAO, CBD, Interpol 
and certain other United Nations programmes 
(UNCTAD, UNDP, UNCHR). Given the crosscut-
ting nature of IPRs, this horizontal expansion of 
institutions dealing with IP matters raises complex 
issues and concerns about policy coherence.
Notwithstanding the relative isolation of the IP 
system, its evolution has not been free from con-
troversy. Critics have emphasised its failure to 
keep-up with new technological challenges such 
that it has adversely affected competitive envi-
ronments for consumers and producers of knowl-
edge. This has been highlighted prominently in a 
wide range of recent publications. In addition, 
critics have contended that the current system 
lacks inclusiveness and is failing to advance an 
IP agenda that responds to the needs of the 21st 
century. An important angle in recent debates has 
been the broad implications for development and 
the role of developing countries in the evolution 
of the international system. These aspects were 
first highlighted in the 2002 Report of the Com-
mission on IPRs and Development and in recent 
debates in the World Intellectual Property Organi-
sation (WIPO) on a development agenda. 
The development agenda deliberations initiated 
by a group of developing countries at the WIPO 
General Assembly in September 2004 seek the 
integration of development into the work of the 
organisation. Its original objective was to ensure 
that IP policy-making better takes into account 
development concerns, such as the need to pro-
mote access to technical knowledge, encourage 
technology transfer, maintain public interest flex-
ibilities, and prevent anticompetitive practices. 
Against this background, ICTSD facilitated a 
Dialogue among selected Geneva-based ambassa-
dors on 20 November 2006 with the view of brain-
storming around:
• Revisiting and identifying the main challenges 
of today’s IP system; 
• Contributing to the conceptualisation of 
these challenges; and, 
• Exploring initiatives that could be promoted 
at the international level, particularly in the 
context of the Geneva debates, including 
potential opportunities for advancing a 
development agenda in WIPO. 
For the purposes of facilitating the exchange of 
ideas, ICTSD invited the following distinguished 
experts to prepare discussion notes to serve as a 
basis for the brainstorming session: Professor Fred 
Abbott (Florida University); Professor John Barton 
(Stanford University); Professor Carlos Correa (Uni-
versity of Buenos Aires); Professor Josef Drexl (Max-
Planck Institute, Munich); Professor Dominique 
Foray (Ecole Polytechnique Fédéral de Lausanne) 
and Ron Marchant, Esq. (UK Patent Office).
This publication is a compilation of the notes pro-
duced by these experts to assist in the delibera-
tions of 20 November 2006.
The notes included in this compilation tackle, 
with more or less emphasis, the three main topics 
identified above. For example, Dominique Foray’s 
note refers to the relevance of IP in the knowledge 
economy, explaining the importance of the rapid 
dissemination of new and superior knowledge. 
However, he points out that rapid dissemination 
can be the enemy of innovation. In this context, he 
explains that the patent system has many virtues 
as an incentive to future inventors. However, by 
recognising exclusive rights, the patent restricts 
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de facto the use of knowledge and its exploita-
tion. Patents and other intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) are by no means the only solution to the 
problem of supporting inventors in their effort to 
capture benefits stemming from their work. There 
are many other solutions to help markets produce 
knowledge. In spite of some misuses of the pat-
ent system leading to high transaction costs and 
risks of innovation blockages, it is still a vital in-
stitution for innovation policy. The system is vital, 
not so much for its value of providing motivation 
to inventors, but for creating a secure economic 
environment for the very high investments that 
convert ideas into reality. However, Dominique 
Foray concludes that the high value of the system 
as “a tool for economic growth” does not apply 
equally to all countries. 
Frederick Abbott elaborates on the fundamental 
policy questions for the WIPO development agen-
da. He looks at the main sources of the initiative 
put forward by the Group of Friends of Devel-
opment in 2004. In his view, the initiative is in-
tricately tied to potential forward movement on 
the draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT). 
Professor Abbot addresses two fundamental 
questions: (1) what are the potential costs and 
benefits of moving forward with the draft SPLT 
(and under what conditions), and (2) what could 
reasonably be demanded from the WIPO Develop-
ment Agenda?
John H. Barton focuses on patents as the statu-
tory mechanism for encouraging innovation.  He 
notes that attitudes toward IP are cyclic over 
time.  During the period before about 1980, the US 
had a very weak patent system, and constrained 
it strongly with antitrust principles.  A number of 
recent developments suggest that the pendulum 
of IP may be beginning to swing back at the do-
mestic level. He notes that at the international 
level, however, the pendulum has not yet started 
back. He concludes with four recommendations 
for: a harmonised IP system on reasonable terms; 
a management system for bilateral trade agree-
ments; a global deal in pharmaceuticals between 
the research based and the generic industries; and 
technology transfer barrier issues.
Josef Drexl concludes that the international IP 
system is increasingly departing from a compe-
tition-oriented economic order that includes IP 
rights as necessary elements of dynamic com-
petition. He is of the view that in recent years, 
expansionist developments of IP law have gradu-
ally replaced a pro-competitive IP system with 
a more “proprietary” system that protects those 
who already own IP rights against new entrants 
in technology and knowledge-based markets. The 
issue is not whether we need stronger protec-
tion in addition to TRIPS standards. The issue is 
rather one of a different quality of IP protection. 
He argues in favour of an integrated concept of 
“intellectual property and competition law”. One 
recommendation he makes is for WTO Members to 
work on more specific rules for controlling anti-
competitive use of IPRs. 
Carlos Correa delineates the function of IP in a 
knowledge-based economy by its role and limita-
tions. He addresses the question of the flexibility 
of the system to tailor national implementation 
to the respective industrial and socio-economic 
circumstances of countries, particularly after the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. He stresses that 
it is extremely difficult to determine the causal 
relationship between certain levels of intellec-
tual property protection and indicators of trade, 
investment, innovation, and technology transfer. 
Although several studies have explored the rela-
tionship between intellectual property and some 
of these variables, their results are far from 
conclusive. His paper concludes with some broad 
observations on IP governance with particular ref-
erence to technical assistance. 
Ron Marchant analyses the economic and political 
considerations underpinning the IP system both in 
developed and developing countries. He explains 
that developed countries have largely driven the 
IP agenda at the global level. At the same time, he 
argues that governments of developed countries 
recognise that the world trading system and glo-
bal stability require an increase in self-sufficiency 
and economic strength in developing countries, 
both as markets and trading partners. He argues 
that it is imperative that the WIPO Development 
Agenda be given substance. However, he suggests 
that the existing architecture is not fully fit for 
this purpose. It is still too focused on the inter-
nalities of IP systems and does not integrate IP into 
commercial, innovation, social, and international 
policy. He contends that too often national offices 
are isolated from policy-making, sometimes even 
in relation to IP, and cannot think broadly about 
IP. In the short-term, he proposes the following 
priorities: encourage the wider consideration of 
IP in the context of other policy objectives; iden-
tify and agree on a subset of the issues on the 
current development agenda; agree on the form 
and nature of development impact assessments; 
work through Programme and Budget and with the 
Audit Committee to improve decision-making and 
accountability within WIPO.
In brief, these are all important contributions by 
distinguished experts on how to move the intel-
lectual property system forward to meet the chal-
lenges of the 21st century, paying particular atten-
tion to sustainable development considerations. 
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the Production And diFFusion 
oF knowledge: the economic 
trAde-oFF
Broad and rapid diffusion of new and “supe-
rior” knowledge is good for social well-being. 
It is quite obvious that efficiency and growth 
are promoted by the rapidity with which new 
knowledge and new technologies are dissemi-
nated: the greater the share of individuals, 
firms or countries that make use of superior 
products and processes, and the sooner they do 
so, rather than being confined to inferior sub-
stitutes, the more widespread and substantial 
the growth benefits should be.
However, we know also that rapid dissemina-
tion can be the enemy of innovation. If a firm 
expends considerable money and effort to carry 
out its innovation programme, but finds that 
other firms rapidly share in the fruits of its in-
vestment, why should that firm devote time, ef-
fort and funding to continue that programme?
In summary, rapid dissemination is good for 
social well-being but bad for private returns: 
no one wants to invest in the creation of new 
knowledge if free sharing and dissemination 
occur too rapidly.
This is why it is important to devise social 
mechanisms to allow the knowledge producer 
to capture (at least) a fraction of the ben-
efits generated by the invention. But from the 
point of view of society, the efficiency of these 
mechanisms will depend on the kind of balance 
which is built between the two elements of the 
trade-off: namely, providing a means for the 
knowledge producer to capture the benefits 
of his effort whilst maximising the social dis-
semination of the knowledge. Institutions that 
govern the creation and diffusion of knowledge 
have always been moulded by this so-called 
knowledge trade-off. 
A knowledge economy is an economy charac-
terised by the centrality of the production of 
novel ideas that subsequently lead to new or 
improved goods, services and organisational 
practices. In such an economy, these governing 
institutions are more important than ever and 
tend to become central in society.
In this note, I will briefly review some of them 
and discuss some specific “design options” as ap-
propriate ways to solve the tension between the 
maximisation of the inventor’s private interests 
and the socially optimal use of knowledge.
PAtents
Among these mechanisms, intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and patents are of particular signifi-
cance. A patent is a legal device which is gen-
erally defined as a right to exclude. It ensures 
inventors the right to a temporary monopoly on 
a technical invention. It is a property title that is 
valid in time and geographic space. In exchange 
for patent rights the inventor must publicly di-
vulge the technical details on the invention. This 
is the typical response of the patent system to 
the knowledge trade-off. The public availability 
of the technical description is an essential el-
ement: it is the basis of the balance between 
the inventor’s interests and those of society. The 
patent is thus a mechanism facilitating access 
to knowledge (before its creation in the 16th 
century, inventors were hostile to the idea of 
revealing new knowledge). 
The patent system has many virtues beyond its 
main role to provide an “incentive” (an economic 
motivation) to future inventors. Firstly, it facili-
tates the market test of new inventions because 
it allows disclosure of related information while 
protecting against imitation. Secondly, patents 
create transferable rights and can therefore 
help to structure complex market transactions 
of technologies. Patents are an essential ele-
ment of the legal infrastructure of the markets 
for technologies that are in certain industries a 
source of great efficiency. Thirdly, patents are 
a means to signal and assess the future value of 
the technological efforts of young companies for 
which other classes of “intangibles” cannot be 
used for proper evaluation.
However, by imposing exclusive rights, the pat-
ent restricts de facto the use of knowledge and 
its exploitation by those who might have ben-
efited from it had it been free. This is a case 
for social inefficiency. Some other shortcomings 
of the system, from a social point of view, are 
caused simply by inappropriate modes of use of 
patents. A case in point is the so-called “strategic 
use” of patents by firms. Some firms use them as 
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bargaining chips in cross-licensing agreements. 
Such strategic use has little to do with protect-
ing innovation whilst increasing the asymmetry 
of power relations between the big and small 
players in bargaining and negotiation. There 
is now strong evidence that in some industries 
the increasing number of patent applications is 
explained not by the need to protect more in-
novations, but by some strategic use purposes. 
“I just don’t know what is in my portfolio of 8000 
patents” is a good quotation from a Chief R&D 
Officer of a large and well known company that 
illustrates the magnitude of the problem. In this 
respect many shortcomings in the patent system 
are not inevitable, for they are not intrinsically 
associated with the concept of intellectual prop-
erty, but result from a mode of use that leads to 
blockages or slows down innovation.
Given both advantages and shortcomings, the 
patent system has often been qualified as a 
“necessary ill”. Economists agree that it is a 
good thing for innovation and growth, provided 
the negative effects on the economy are re-
duced. However, recent trends are towards i) 
strategic use; ii) patents moving up to the do-
mains of scientific research (research tools); iii) 
the broadening of the possible subject matters 
(business methods, software, living organisms) 
which leads to some weakening of the basic 
rules. All these trends have caused economists 
to question whether the “ill” is perhaps greater 
than generally believed. And perhaps it is an ill 
which is no longer necessary, since we clearly 
see some other mechanisms doing a better 
job, supporting innovation without creating 
exclusivity and monopoly. For instance, we can 
observe the current knowledge boom of some 
social systems – such as “open-source” and 
“open collaborative research” – in which high 
rates of innovation are correlated with a rich 
and instantaneous, free-revealing pattern, im-
plying that private inventors do not always rely 
on exclusivity and excludability mechanisms to 
capture the private benefits from their intel-
lectual assets and creative work.
PAtent: one solution Among 
mAny 
Patents and other IPRs are by no means the only 
solution to the problem of supporting inventors 
in their effort to capture benefits stemming 
from their inventions. There are many other 
solutions to help markets encourage the pro-
duction of knowledge, and one interesting fea-
ture is that each of those solutions proposes a 
specific response to the knowledge trade-off. 
For example, being the first to produce new 
knowledge may be sufficient in certain cases to 
capture a good fraction of the benefits, since 
dissemination, even if it is free, does not occur 
immediately; hence the fact of being first is an 
asset which can be converted into positive pric-
es even in a private competitive market. Devel-
oping prize-mechanisms (either a prize offered 
for innovation that is not identified in advance 
or a targeted prize rewarding an invention 
which has been identified in advance) or subsi-
dising research are other possible alternatives; 
each offering a particular treatment of the 
knowledge trade-off. The prize system is par-
ticularly interesting since it has the advantage 
of creating a public good: once the invention 
has been made, it is made publicly available 
whilst the inventor is compensated by receiving 
the monetary value of the “social return” of 
the invention. While patents create a monopoly 
with a high potential for exclusion and social 
inefficiencies, prizes reward inventions for con-
tributing to the public domain. But this system 
may be hard to implement, not a minor issue: 
the estimation of an amount for the prize (i.e. 
the social value of the new knowledge) raises 
difficult problems, and its administration would 
require some kind of central decision making. 
These two difficulties are ignored by the patent 
system.
designing “suPerior” solutions
How the knowledge trade-off should be solved 
(and so what kind of mechanism should be used) 
depends obviously on the nature of the knowl-
edge and the characteristics of the economic 
environment. For example, if the issue to be 
addressed is encouraging the invention of vac-
cines for tropical diseases, there are two argu-
ments for not using the patent system and for 
developing a kind of prize-mechanism instead: 
firstly, companies know that poor countries will 
not be able to afford new products at a mo-
nopoly price, and therefore the private ration-
ale to use the patent system is weakened (or 
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companies anticipate that they will be forced 
to sell the product at a lower price and again 
the economic motivation to undertake the re-
search is undermined); secondly, that access to 
the new knowledge will be so vital that creat-
ing a monopoly would generate very high social 
costs and inefficiencies.
Economists and policy makers are interested not 
so much in a particular mechanism but in the 
design of “superior” solutions to the knowledge 
trade-off. This is certainly the most interesting 
policy question: what is the right mechanism 
for a socially efficient solution to the problem? 
Helping the market to invent a new vaccine for 
a global disease, an orphan drug, a new encryp-
tion method or a new environmental technology 
involves the mobilisation of different classes of 
solutions.
the PAtent system hAs  
diFFerent sociAl vAlues  
For diFFerent stAges oF  
develoPment
Despite some misuses of the patent system lead-
ing to high transaction costs and risks of innova-
tion blockages, it is still recognised as a vital 
institution for innovation policy. It is vital not 
so much for its value in providing motivation to 
inventors (how many great inventors never used 
the patent system whilst maintaining their cre-
ative drive?) but for creating a secure economic 
environment for the very high investments that 
convert ideas into reality.
However the high value of the patent system 
as “a tool for economic growth” does not ap-
ply equally to all countries. It is certainly an 
important tool for leading countries at the 
technological frontier. It is also an important 
tool for those countries that are successfully 
committed into the catching-up economically, 
involving the slow transformation of an econo-
my based on imitation to an economy based on 
innovation. In these countries, growing entre-
preneurial activities certainly need the patent 
system. This is however not the case for the 
least developed countries (LDCs). And the cur-
rent tendency to strengthen the patent system 
by forcing all countries to implement a legal 
system that will guarantee the enforceability 
of IPRs – the WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
– puts LDCs at great risk (even if some transi-
tion periods are allowed for the poorest ones). 
The official TRIPS message is that LDCs should 
take this legal obligation as a good deal. The 
introduction of a legal system to enforce IPRs 
everywhere is of course a good thing for mul-
tinational companies (MNCs) which can expect 
an increase in the profitability of their R&D in-
vestments. It would also be a good thing for 
developing countries themselves if such a legal 
evolution created incentives for the endog-
enous development of domestic entrepreneurial 
capacities, and helped these countries attract 
more foreign direct investment (FDI), including 
the transfer of R&D capacities.
It is, however, quite certain that things will not 
happen this way, since: 
1) throughout history, stronger patent 
systems have tended to be the result 
of technological development, not a 
precondition; 
2) stronger patent rights are likely to increase 
payments from developing to developed 
countries for technology rights; 
3) international trade flows and FDI respond 
positively to strengthened patent rights 
in middle-income and large developing 
countries, but not in the poorest ones. 
In other words, if, as an LDC, you want to at-
tract FDI or promote entrepreneurial activi-
ties at home, you need to solve many difficult 
problems before dealing with the patent issue. 
Thus, the relevant policy question is to ask at 
what stage of development will economic and 
market-based incentives (such as patents) start 
to matter in encouraging productive entrepre-
neurial activities and attracting more FDI.
For LDCs, as far as IPRs and patents are con-
cerned, the right policy orientation should be 
to put more emphasis on preventing the poten-
tial collateral damage that strengthening IP is 
likely to generate, rather than on using IPR as a 
positive market incentive to support entrepre-
neurship and attract FDI.
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From the perspective of world trade regula-
tion, intellectual property (IP) is as valuable a 
monetary asset as a bond or currency.  Some 
countries have major oil reserves, some have 
abundant fertile land, and some have more 
extensive capacity to develop and commer-
cialise technology.  Oil reserves and farmland 
are tangible and can be protected by track-
ing equipment, fences and security guards. 
Technology embodied in intellectual property 
is “ephemeral”, prone to leakage, and eas-
ily transported across borders. It is difficult 
to track or protect with cryptographic fences. 
Intellectual property is protectable by legal 
rules, but because it is readily transported 
across borders, this protection is highly de-
pendent on international legal co-operation.
Historically, the division between the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries and develop-
ing countries regarding intellectual property 
has been based on a fundamental disparity 
between the “haves” and “have-nots”. OECD 
countries view IP as monetary “assets” that 
deserve protection, just as financial instru-
ments deserve protection.  The right to pro-
tection derives from the “investment” in re-
search and development (R&D) that generates 
the technology assets. Developing countries 
have based weak enforcement policies large-
ly on claims to “moral justice” that demand a 
rebalancing of global economic position, and 
on the apparent “cost-free” character of pre-
existing technology.
The North-South dividing line regarding IP policy 
was clearer when the “haves” and “have-nots” 
were comparatively easy to identify.  However, 
over the past decade, a number of major de-
veloping country actors have entered a new 
“middle ground” which places them squarely in 
neither camp.  (This type of transition reflects 
also the historical pattern of countries, which 
today is part of the OECD.) The emergence 
of China and India as centres of innovation is 
fundamentally altering the dynamic between 
the “haves” and “have-nots”. Both these coun-
tries are presently undergoing difficult internal 
IP policy transformations as their interests in 
promoting and protecting domestic innovation 
achieves greater parity with their interests in 
making low-cost use of externally-generated 
innovation.  Similarly, other major developing 
country economies, such as Brazil, are progres-
sively more successful in selected high-technol-
ogy sectors, for instance, intermediate-sized 
civilian aircraft, and are increasingly seeking 
to identify the proper balance between more 
and less protective IP policies.
The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Development Agenda (WDA) arose 
principally from two sources.  The first was 
from non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
pressure, which had its foundation in the way 
that patents were being used to limit access 
to medicines. WIPO technical advice to devel-
oping countries in the formulation and imple-
mentation of their patent laws was considered 
inconsistent with the perspective of the NGOs 
and the “softened” rules at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Consequently, changes at 
WIPO were perceived as necessary to maintain 
and advance modest successes at the WTO in 
generating greater sensitivity toward social 
objectives. (There are other NGO interests 
participating in the development agenda, 
such as the “open source” movement, but 
these NGO interests have not generated the 
same type of public pressure as the “access to 
medicines” movement.)
The second pressure was from a group of de-
veloping countries, which determined as a 
collective internal policy matter that further 
moves to harmonise and consolidate regula-
tory authority over the international patent 
system would adversely affect their interests. 
This determination was presumably based on a 
calculation that harmonisation and consolida-
tion would reduce the discretion of their leg-
islatures and national patent offices to limit 
patent applications or refuse enforcement of 
patents. Given that the great preponderance 
of global patent ownership is in the hands of 
enterprises based in OECD countries, and that 
shifts in the pattern of patent ownership are 
likely to emerge slowly, more comprehensive 
systems of protection on the part of develop-
ing countries will result in net royalty outflows. 
From this perspective, resistance to harmonisa-
tion and consolidation by a group of developing 
countries may be economically justifiable.
9ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development
It is not clear that the objectives of the NGO 
“access to medicines” movement and the more 
general interests of the group of developing 
countries need to be addressed in the same 
way.  A reasonable argument can be made that 
public health-related patent issues should be 
“carved out” of the general IP system and ad-
dressed differently than patent issues in other 
fields of technology, such as civilian aircraft, 
electronics, communications, power genera-
tion, and so forth.  This is because the social 
welfare cost of “strong patents” may be sig-
nificantly greater in the field of medicines 
than in other areas. In fact, historically, medi-
cines-related patents (and food-related pat-
ents) were often treated differently to those 
relating to other fields precisely because of 
concerns over the social cost of strong patents 
in the field of medicines.
From a negotiating standpoint, the propos-
als for an ambitious WDA put forward by the 
Group of Friends of Development may be linked 
to potential forward movement on the draft 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT). That is, 
there is a group of developed countries that 
may be unwilling to permit forward movement 
on the WDA as a stand-alone matter.  Without 
prejudice to the answer, it may be useful to 
explore two fundamental questions: (1) what 
are the potential costs and benefits of moving 
forward with the draft SPLT and under what 
conditions, and (2) what could reasonably be 
demanded from the WDA?
How the group of developing countries pro-
moting the WDA should address potential 
movement on the substantive patent law har-
monisation is a difficult and nuanced question. 
The difficulty arises from consideration of his-
tory and from current economic trends. The 
further question is what alternatives may be 
reasonably available?
There is strong demand from certain OECD 
business groups to make the granting and en-
forcement of patents both in developed and 
developing countries more efficient. In the 
early 1980s, when OECD business groups were 
frustrated in their efforts to enhance global IP 
protection at WIPO, they ingeniously shifted 
forums to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and ultimately out-manoeuvred 
developing countries.  Today, there is simi-
lar OECD business group frustration at WIPO 
– although it is less intense than the pressure 
that drove the WTO Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) negotiations in the Uruguay Round – on 
the subject of substantive patent law har-
monisation, but forum shifting to the WTO is 
politically unfeasible. It would, however, be 
short-sighted to assume that the pressure will 
simply “dissipate”.  Already forum shifting is 
taking place in two contexts: (1) bilateral and 
regional agreements where substantive patent 
law harmonisation is part of the package, and 
(2) mini-lateral patent office meetings among 
developed countries, whether styled Group 
B+, OECD or otherwise.
From the perspective of the group of develop-
ing countries, the optimist would say that the 
major developing country actors have so far 
successfully resisted bilateral and regional pat-
ent harmonisation, and that the bilateral and 
regional agreements reached to date are with 
less economically significant national actors. 
Perhaps more important, the optimist would 
say that an agreement between, the European 
Union (EU), Japan, Switzerland, the United 
States (US), and other OECD countries, on 
substantive and procedural patent harmonisa-
tion is of minor consequence because it simply 
would not apply among the group of developing 
countries.  In that sense, there is the historical 
precedent of the GATT Uruguay Round negotia-
tions in which early OECD proposals focused on 
a “code” among like-minded participants. The 
OECD ultimately abandoned the code strategy 
when it became apparent that this approach 
would not address the very countries that the 
OECD sought to “bring into the fold”.  The op-
timist would argue that an intra-OECD patent 
agreement is a hollow threat. The optimist 
might also ask whether the patent and trade 
officials of the EU, Japan, Switzerland, and the 
US, who are advocating the SPLT, are in fact 
pursuing a strong mandate from their govern-
ments. Perhaps, for example, the United States 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary is less than 
fully prepared to cede its discretion and power 
regarding the characteristics of the US patent 
system pursuant to a multilateral agreement. 
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The pessimist may ask what will ultimately 
be the position of China and India (as well as 
Russia) in this strategic game?  Here we are 
confronted with imperfect information and 
predictive difficulties.  In considering India, 
it is difficult to ignore the increasing internal 
alignment of the Indian patent and regulatory 
system with those of the OECD countries, as 
well as the strong patent faction within the 
government promoting that alignment, rec-
ognising that there are strongly competing 
viewpoints on patent issues within India.  This 
movement appears to be based on a belief 
that such alignment is useful for the attrac-
tion of foreign capital and, to a lesser extent, 
on its potential to stimulate local innovation. 
China is more opaque, but again it is difficult 
to ignore the rising tide of Chinese innovation 
and the strong local interest in patent protec-
tion as evidenced by the high filing rate of ap-
plications.  Although we certainly do not have 
enough information to draw a firm conclusion 
about this, the pessimist might conclude that 
China and India will eventually join an OECD 
patent harmonisation and consolidation exer-
cise (we have limited information about Russia 
in this context). The pessimist might note that 
the US Congress has already approved a series 
of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
that harmonise standards of patentability, so 
that it might well be prepared to cede its dis-
cretion at the multilateral level. At the end of 
the day (or a decade), a few major developing 
country economies and a number of moder-
ate to smaller developing country economies 
might remain outside a more harmonised pat-
ent system. 
The consequences for two or three major de-
veloping economies and a number of smaller 
developing economies that remain outside an 
otherwise global patent harmonisation and 
consolidation system are not easy to foresee 
or predict. There would undoubtedly be pres-
sure from trading partners to join the system 
and that pressure might be accompanied by 
implicit or explicit threats to withdraw trade 
benefits.  There may or may not be effects 
on the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
There may be consequences with respect to 
the level of local investment in R&D. What is 
relatively certain is that countries that choose 
to remain apart from the negotiations will 
have less impact or influence on the ultimate 
system that is designed.
Policy makers from the group of developing 
countries promoting the WDA must, of course, 
ask, what is the best internal domestic policy 
for their countries? That assessment will differ 
depending upon the specific characteristics of 
the local economy. It may be that the social 
costs that would result from flexibilities lost 
as a consequence of a SPLT would exceed the 
gains from potential increased FDI and R&D 
investment, and that the potential negative 
consequences for trade flows imposed by the 
OECD as indirect or direct “sanction” would not 
substantially alter that balance. (Of course, as 
with the Uruguay Round negotiations, the fact 
that an agreement on IP would result in net 
royalty outflows does not necessarily mean 
that offsetting benefits could not be secured 
in other trade-related sectors.)
If the group of developing countries behind 
the WDA determines that blocking forward 
movement on the draft SPLT is the best strat-
egy, this may produce a stalemate regarding 
forward movement on the WDA. In that con-
text, questions about what might best be in-
cluded within the WDA are less relevant and 
important.  (To be clear, this is not express-
ing a judgment about the correct develop-
ing country assessment of the situation, but 
rather attempting to identify the predictable 
consequences.) 
If it is assumed, for the sake of argument, 
that a political decision is made in favour of 
allowing the harmonisation agenda to move 
forward, what demands might be made with 
respect to the draft SPLT?  The following are 
put forward for consideration:
1) The criteria of patentability must be 
framed in a way that permits countries to 
introduce and maintain socially important 
checks and balances on the granting of 
patents.  Countries should not be required 
to adopt the very liberal approach to 
inventive step and utility that has been 
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followed by the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and the European Patent 
Office (EPO). In this regard, for example, 
India’s Patents Act provides for an 
assessment of efficacy with respect 
to pharmaceutical inventions. This 
should be within the permitted range of 
acceptable assessment of patentability. 
In this regard, the “battle-ground” of the 
negotiations would shift to the technical 
elements of the solution – particularly the 
definition of “inventive step”. This would 
require active engagement by patent 
law experts in challenging assumptions 
presently made in the draft texts;
2) There should be no explicit or implicit 
requirement that patents in all fields of 
technology must be treated “the same”. 
At a minimum, the notion from WTO law 
that “differentiation” does not constitute 
“discrimination” must be imported into 
the WIPO process. A demand should be 
maintained that in fields of essential social 
interest, such as medicines and nutrition, 
countries must have the flexibility to 
adopt and implement exceptions to the 
rights of patent holders. Moreover, the 
notion that exceptions must be “narrow” 
based on the WTO panel decision in 
Canada – Generic Pharmaceuticals, should 
be challenged;
3) It should be made explicit that the patent 
system does not “trump” other fields of 
national regulatory interest.  A patent is 
not an unfettered right of exploitation. 
Its exercise may be subject to ordinary 
regulatory controls. Competition law 
may be applied to the exercise of patent 
rights, as may health and safety laws, 
price controls, and so forth. 
The second fundamental question is what may 
constitute WDA demands that could further 
develop interests and yet be within the rea-
sonable contemplation of the OECD countries 
on the other side?
1) WIPO technical assistance in the drafting 
and implementation of IP legislation 
plays a critical role in the ultimate result 
for many developing and least developed 
countries. Demands that WIPO should not 
attempt to impose an internal preference 
for particular types of legislative 
solutions, but instead provide a range of 
policy options within the framework of 
agreed international minimum standards, 
would assist in improving the overall 
environment both within WIPO and within 
recipient countries;
2) Information concerning the patent status 
of products, including pharmaceutical 
products, has proven exceedingly 
difficult to obtain.  The lack of 
transparency regarding patent status 
may shift purchasing patterns and inhibit 
local production efforts.  A proposal to 
establish a transparent database linking 
patents to products, along with penalties 
for the provision of false information, 
may aid developing countries;
3) Competition law is the principal legal 
avenue for exercising control over abuse 
of power with respect to intellectual 
property rights.  With some exceptions, 
developing country bureaucratic 
structures for the implementation and 
enforcement of competition law are not 
strong.  A commitment of resources to 
train competition enforcement authorities 
would assist in building up capacity, 
as might consideration of regional 
cooperative enforcement networks;
4) OECD countries invest substantial public 
resources on research and development 
for new technologies.  Many developing 
countries lack the resources to create 
viable R&D–based institutions. OECD 
commitments to fund such institutions 
in developing countries may assist in 
reducing the capacity gap;
5) Serious attention to the issue of protection 
of rights in bio–diverse resources is 
required. Developing countries have 
made concrete proposals regarding the 
requirement of disclosure of source and 
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origin of biological resources. Developed 
countries must seriously engage on this 
issue;
6) The proper functioning of the patent 
system is strongly dependent upon 
“patent quality”.  Assessments of patent 
quality are highly dependent upon access 
to information relevant to the criteria 
of patentability, and upon the technical 
training of patent examiners.  Extensive 
effort is needed to improve developing 
country capacity regarding access to 
information and training. A multilateral 
effort to establish data banks of relevant 
technology and to improve patent examiner 
training would benefit all parties working 
in or affected by the patent system.
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i. introduction:  
Function oF iP And rAtionAle
The function of intellectual property (IP) sys-
tems is to encourage innovation and creativity. 
I will concentrate in this paper on patents, the 
area in which I have most background.  Patents 
are a statutory mechanism encouraging inno-
vation.  Upon describing the details of a new 
invention, and filing appropriate papers and 
fees, an inventor can obtain a certificate ex-
cluding others from practising the invention, 
provided that certain statutory standards have 
been satisfied.
However, three real world points should be 
mentioned.  First, any legal mechanism is im-
perfect and the patent system is an example. 
Thus, very silly patents have been issued.  Liti-
gation to enforce a patent is enormously ex-
pensive and some firms have gained large sums 
from enforcing whose validity is questionable. 
Second, the real working of the patent system 
varies from industry to industry.  In the phar-
maceutical industry, the system works pretty 
much as intended: the period of monopoly 
created by a patent provides an opportunity 
for extra profit and firms invest in research in 
anticipation of receiving such a profit.  In con-
trast, in much of the electronics and compu-
ter world, firms market products that embody 
many inventions patented by many different 
firms. Although they sometimes obtain licenc-
es to use specific inventions, they often simply 
maintain a large portfolio of patents that their 
competitors are infringing.  They thus deter a 
lawsuit by threatening a counter lawsuit.
Third, attitudes toward IP are cyclic over 
time.  During the period before about 1980, 
the United States (US) had a very weak patent 
system, and constrained it strongly with anti-
trust principles.  Since then, this has changed 
by moving towards strong IP and weak anti-
trust. A number of recent US Supreme Court 
decisions, a series of studies, and legislation 
being considered by the US Congress, all sug-
gest that the pendulum of IP may be beginning 
to swing back towards the domestic level.
ii. the ActuAl internAtionAl  
institutionAl stAtus
At the international level, however, the pendu-
lum has not yet started back.  There have been 
recent efforts to negotiate stronger patent prin-
ciples at WIPO.  Far more important, there are 
substantial efforts, particularly by the US, to 
negotiate bilateral arrangements to strengthen 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). These efforts 
reflect several pressures.  First, many of those 
involved in the negotiations genuinely believe 
that strong IPRs are generally “a good thing.” 
Second, both the European Union (EU) and the 
US benefit economically from stronger foreign 
IP rights because such strengthening will lead 
to an increased flow of royalties or profits in 
the entertainment and pharmaceutical areas. 
These industries are placing strong pressure 
on the negotiators of the developed nations. 
Hence, there is a sense in the US, at least that 
if stronger IP cannot be negotiated at the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), it should 
be obtained bilaterally.
One more international pressure should be not-
ed.  The major patent offices (European, Japa-
nese, and US) are facing enormous increases 
in their search load and are looking for ways 
to share the burden.  This, together with the 
business sector’s desire for simpler processes to 
obtain global patent coverage, is creating pres-
sure for harmonisation (which is, to some ex-
tent, a step towards a global patent system).
iii. PAtent stAtus And  
the one size Fits All issue
Within the developed world, there has been 
a recent series of critiques of the patent sys-
tem. These were spelt out in a study by the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics in 2002, a report 
by the US Federal Trade Commission in 2003, 
a study by the Royal Society in 2003, and two 
reports by the US National Research Council in 
2004 and 2006.  Although these reports differ 
in detail and focus, they agree enough to de-
fine an agenda for patent reform.  Some of the 
critiques question the extension of the patent 
system into such new sectors such as software, 
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business methods, and certain forms of bio-
logical and genetic information.  Essentially, all 
seek to raise the standards for granting patents, 
normally seeking an increased inventive step to 
distinguish the particular invention from pre-
existing ideas. Some propose improved review 
methods to avoid silly patents.
Not only do these critiques seek to change the 
standards for granting patents, they also seek 
to facilitate the use of patented inventions in 
the course of research.  In addition, there has 
been US Congressional discussion on restricting 
the availability of injunctions requiring that a 
manufacturer stop manufacturing an infringing 
product.  (Damages would still be available.) 
In general the pharmaceutical industry opposes 
such a change whilst the computer industry 
would be happier with an arrangement that 
restricts injunctions.  The US Supreme Court 
already rebalanced the law quite significantly 
in 2006 in eBay v. MercExchange.
For developing nations, the issue is whether 
the patent system as currently practised, or as 
reformed in the ways described above, is eco-
nomically beneficial.  As discussed in the 2002 
Report of the UK Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, one size does not fit all.  The 
poorest nations do not really need a patent sys-
tem because there are few scientists and engi-
neers and the markets are generally too small 
to be a significant incentive to innovation.  It is 
only as a nation becomes middle income that 
a patent system becomes useful.  At the same 
time, it must also be recognised that the most 
serious harms of a patent system for a poor na-
tion are in the pharmaceutical sector and that 
they have been partly resolved by Doha. 
iv. recommendAtions
I have four recommendations for new initiatives 
for consideration:
A. A harmonised system on  
reasonable terms 
First, I think that developing nations would not 
be significantly harmed by a globally harmo-
nised (or even integrated) patent system, pro-
vided the system were designed along the lines 
laid out by the recent critiques. I fear that the 
alternative is that the US, and possibly EU na-
tions, will seek a system that is stronger and will 
then effectively force it on developing nations 
through bilateral negotiations.  Hence, I think 
the developing world would benefit from nego-
tiations for a globally-balanced patent system.
This could be sought in a WIPO Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents (SCP) context, 
assuming there is a way beyond the current im-
passes.  As I understand the negotiations, part 
of the problem is that the US is not following 
the agenda suggested by the recent critiques 
– the job is to find a way to bring those critiques 
more fully into the negotiations.  Presumably, 
the only kind of treaty currently plausible is 
one that harmonises the standards for granting 
patents. In this context, the benefits of dif-
ferentiation for developing nations are minor. 
It will be some time before negotiations reach 
the very separate issues of enforcing patents, 
which would include antitrust and compulsory 
licences, etc.  These issues are much more po-
litically and technically complex.
b. A management system for  
bilateral Agreements
In the meantime, the most important issue for 
developing nations is the fact that they are be-
ing pushed into a variety of forms of stronger 
IP protection in bilateral negotiations.  There 
has also been talk that these bilateral efforts 
might extend to areas like compulsory licensing 
and antitrust in ways that could be extremely 
damaging.  Here, it would be wise to brain-
storm some effective diplomatic deterrents.  It 
is unrealistic to anticipate a rule that excludes 
IP provisions from bilateral trade agreements. 
However, it might be realistic to use the Arti-
cle XXIV WTO review procedure, the WTO Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism, or a WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) Council resolution as a basis 
for critique of bilateral IP agreements, both to 
ensure that the nations involved know the im-
plications of the TRIPS-plus IP provisions and to 
begin a discussion on which provisions are to be 
avoided.  The exact strategy and forum deserve 
careful consideration.
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c. A global hatch-waxman
In 1984, the US Congress passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act balancing the rights of the re-
search pharmaceutical industry with those of 
the generic pharmaceutical industry, which 
manufactures lower cost pharmaceuticals that 
are off patent.  The compromise extended the 
research industry’s exclusivity for a reasonable 
period (presented as a way to compensate for 
time spent obtaining product regulatory ap-
proval) and also facilitated generic entry onto 
the market at the time a patent expires. This 
included a simplified regulatory drug approval 
process that enabled the generic manufacturer 
to rely on the clinical data previously provided 
by the pharmaceutical manufacturer.  (The pro-
visions that defined the circumstances in which 
the pharmaceutical firm could prevent the ge-
neric firm from using the data were the source 
of the data protection provisions included in 
TRIPS.) The legislation also included very tech-
nical provisions that have given rise to strategic 
litigation that is currently complicating generic 
entry onto the US market. Clearly these provi-
sions were badly drafted and are not essential 
to the concept of a balance between the two 
branches of the industry.
The Hatch-Waxman Act defined a temporal pe-
riod of patent exclusivity followed by a period 
of generic entry and a falling price. The pre-
2005 world, ended by TRIPS, made a parallel 
geographic distinction allowing patent exclu-
sivity in some nations and generics in others. 
Might there be a new grand bargain that would 
broaden the opportunity for generics in poorer 
nations and, at the same time, reduce some of 
the political pressure to strengthen data pro-
tection and the status of the research industry? 
My suggested balance might give the research 
industry some protection against the importa-
tion of geographically-based generics into the 
developed world, perhaps against price controls 
in the developed world, and would certainly 
provide greater international harmonisation of 
regulatory standards and guarantees of a period 
of public sector procurement for new products 
that benefit the developing world.  In return, 
entry of generics into developing nations would 
be facilitated and data protection would be 
provided only where needed to facilitate the 
introduction of new products.  Obviously, the 
detailed terms of the balance and the strategy 
to achieve such an arrangement require dis-
cussion in both the private and public sectors. 
It might, however, ultimately be ratified as a 
protocol to TRIPS or as an understanding in the 
style of the Doha Declaration.
d. technology transfer barriers
Finally, the more scientifically capable devel-
oping nations are using a variety of ways to at-
tempt to encourage the transfer of technology 
to their industries.  These include, for example, 
subsidies and requirements that those who sell 
to the government or set up new facilities in 
a nation should transfer technology to local 
partners.  Some of these procedures are al-
most certainly unwise economically; others are 
probably wise.  All are subject to developed 
world pressure, through the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
through interpretations of the anti-dumping and 
subsidies codes, and through bilateral nego-
tiations. They may constitute serious barriers to 
technology transfer. The first steps are certainly 
to make an inventory of the procedures and to 
carry out studies to determine which are ef-
fective and which are being prohibited through 
trade negotiations. After that, specific negotiat-
ing goals could be set.
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The following comments are based on a concern 
that the international intellectual property (IP) 
system is departing from a competition-orient-
ed economic order; that is, one that includes 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a neces-
sary element of promoting dynamic competi-
tion. Expansionist developments of IP law tend 
to replace a pro-competitive IP system with a 
more “proprietary” system, protecting those 
who already own IP rights against new entrants 
in technology and knowledge-based markets. 
Whereas the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at least allows 
WTO Members to take into account the need to 
keep IP law pro-competitive, recent bilateral 
trade agreements tend to promote this more 
proprietary approach.
The following comments neglect the overall so-
cietal and human rights dimension of IPRs. This, 
however, is not to say that the need to guar-
antee access to essential drugs or information 
needed for education is not a valid concern.1 On 
the contrary, a competition-oriented approach 
may be helpful in addressing the social and hu-
man problems often linked to IPRs, although 
such an approach is certainly not sufficient to 
solve all of these problems.
i. economic And PoliticAl 
considerAtions relAting to 
the iP system
A. iPrs and the concept of dynamic 
competition on the global level
The general purpose of IPRs is to create incen-
tives for innovation and creativity. However, 
from an economic market-based perspective, 
any concept of IPRs that describes the economic 
objective in an “isolated” way, namely, by only 
looking at the incentive a given right exercises 
on the business decision of an undertaking, nec-
essarily misses the point. Undertakings do not 
invest in research and development (R&D) be-
cause the IP system will pay them adequately, 
but because they hope that the subject matter 
of protection will find a large enough market. 
This explains why the patent system cannot 
convince pharmaceutical companies to invest 
in orphan drugs and why the chemical industry 
invests a lot in patents for cosmetic products, 
despite the fact that they will not win market 
dominance in the highly competitive markets 
for such products. 
The modern economic view, that takes into con-
sideration the impact of IPRs on the market, fol-
lows a theory of complementarity, as is best ex-
plained by the transfer of technology guidelines 
in the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU).2 The European Commission (EC) Transfer of 
Technology Guidelines state that both bodies of 
law, namely IP law and competition law, 
“…share the same basic objective of promoting 
consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of 
resources. Innovation constitutes an essential 
and dynamic component of an open and com-
petitive market economy. Intellectual property 
rights promote dynamic competition by encour-
aging undertakings to invest in developing new 
or improved products and processes. So does 
competition by putting pressure on undertak-
ings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual 
property rights and competition are necessary 
to promote innovation and ensure a competi-
tive exploitation thereof.”3
Without IP protection, undertakings would be 
afraid that competitors would copy (competi-
tion by imitation) and, therefore, would not in-
vest in R&D. Conversely, without competition, a 
monopolist who holds IPRs would not have any 
incentive to reinvest in further innovation since 
this undertaking would already control the 
market and would be able to impose monopoly 
prices. Therefore, both sets of laws, IP laws and 
competition laws, need to be adequately com-
bined in order to promote dynamic competition 
as a condition for a knowledge-based economy. 
As a consequence, IP law itself is in need of 
a “pro-competitive” design. Although the IP 
system excludes imitation in principle by the 
exclusivity of the right, it should not exclude 
competition as such. Market access with better 
or more creative products should always be pos-
sible (competition by substitution).
There is no reason why the role of IPRs at do-
mestic and international levels should be differ-
ent. However, it is obvious that the IP system, 
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as a market-oriented tool, will better serve the 
interests of consumers in economically strong 
markets. Accordingly, the patent system does 
not adequately respond to the need to treat 
diseases that can only be found in poor coun-
tries, although these diseases might affect 
large populations. In addition, the said theory 
of complementarity can only be transposed to 
the international level by conceptualising dy-
namic competition as a “global public good”.4 
In this context, dynamic competition can only 
be considered as a trade-off of benefits arising 
from incentives for innovation and creativity on 
the one hand, and a loss of allocative efficiency 
(price competition) on the other. Whereas, at 
the global level, the overwhelming benefits 
have to be found on the side of innovation, poor 
developing countries may well lose individually. 
Therefore, the argument may be made that IP 
laws do not have to be the same all around the 
world. In particular, countries may be author-
ised to allow imitation to the extent that such 
allowance does not affect the incentive struc-
ture of dynamic competition globally. Offer-
ing cheaper generic HIV drugs to patients that 
would otherwise not be able to buy those drugs 
does not cause a loss to the respective patent 
holders and, therefore, does not harm the in-
centive structure of the patent system.
b. defending a Pro-competitive iP system 
Against Proprietary concepts in FtAs
The above-mentioned rationale, of IP laws rely-
ing on a pro-competitive concept, should not 
just remain at the core of today’s IP system. 
It even needs to be defended against the risk 
of being replaced by a different, namely more 
proprietary, approach that tends to foreclose 
market access. Accordingly, in the context of 
newly concluded free trade agreements (FTAs), 
the term of “TRIPS-plus” standards may not ad-
equately capture what is actually going wrong. 
The issue is not whether we need stronger pro-
tection in addition to TRIPS standards. The is-
sue is rather one of a different quality of IP 
protection.
Just to give a few examples: in the field of 
trademarks, Article 15 (1) of TRIPS allows WTO 
Members to require “distinctiveness”, at least 
acquired by use, as a condition for registration. 
Trademark offices and European courts nowa-
days rely very much on this concept in order to 
make sure that registration of new trademark 
forms, such as those for colours,5 scents6 and 
three-dimensional forms,7 which consumers 
have difficulties in distinguishing, do not fore-
close the market. European practice thereby 
tries to safeguard the trademark system as a 
system that simultaneously gives incentives 
for the quality of goods and services and pro-
motes competition against market foreclosure 
effects.8  In contrast, the US FTAs, with some 
variation, provide for an obligation of the con-
tracting parties to protect problematic trade-
mark forms, like sounds and scents,9 without 
any reservation to distinctiveness. Hence, those 
provisions enable the granting of proprietary 
rights that can almost automatically foreclose 
the market. Most importantly, the “new” ex-
clusive right granted to undisclosed data con-
cerning safety and efficacy of products10 might 
well confer market power to pharmaceutical 
companies for products that do not qualify for 
patent protection or are no longer protected 
by patents.11 Similar to the trademark example 
above, the FTAs protect the market position 
of IP holders against those who want to enter 
the market, a) without sufficient justification 
in the light of a competition-oriented IP system 
and b) whereas Art. 39 (3) of TRIPS only obliges 
Members requesting submission of such data 
to protect that data against unfair commercial 
use.12 Equally, extension of the copyright term 
to 70 years after the death of the author13 very 
much favours the copyright industry, which al-
ready owns copyrights, without providing any 
new incentive to create new works.
c. balancing the interests of  
different Parties concerned in a  
competition-oriented Approach
A competition-oriented approach to IP law is also 
helpful to better balance the interests of the 
different parties concerned. By stimulating in-
vestment in innovation and creativity, such an IP 
system will better serve consumer demand in in-
novative products. “Successful” innovation is al-
lowed, and is even expected, to override inferior 
technology and to win market dominance. How-
ever, such dominant positions in a competition-
oriented IP system should remain contestable. 
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According to the competition-oriented ap-
proach, IP law has to make sure that market 
access for better products is not excluded as 
such. At least, as a matter of principle, there 
should always be the possibility that the incum-
bent might be overturned by more innovative 
products (competition by substitution). Such 
potential competition by future innovation may 
sometimes discipline the behaviour of the dom-
inant firm right away, prevent excessive pricing 
and make sure that the incumbent continues 
to be innovative. The competition-oriented ap-
proach also makes sure that the costs of pro-
duction are kept low. This is why the competi-
tion-oriented approach may also be helpful to 
promote transfer of technology to developing 
countries where production is usually cheaper.
In drafting IP laws, specific exceptions and limi-
tations might be motivated by competition-pol-
icy concerns. This is true, for example, in the 
European rule on decompilation, which allows 
for reverse engineering of computer programmes 
with the objective of creating interoperability of 
the programmes.14 Another example is the ex-
emption of spare parts from design protection.15 
Of course, the competition-oriented approach 
cannot explain all exceptions and limitations, as 
some may be justified by different concerns and 
specific users’ interests only.
In the field of copyright, one should take into 
account the fact that the legislature does not 
only have to solve a conflict between IP own-
ers and users but also has to face a triangle of 
interests with a conflict between the original 
authors and the copyright industry as two dif-
ferent groups of IP owners.16 According to the 
traditional continental European droit d’auteur 
approach, attribution of the original right to 
authors is expected to enable them to gener-
ate equitable remuneration for the economic 
exploitation of their works. As experience has 
shown, however, and as economics can explain, 
the copyright system will not work this way. 
Even in a competitive market, original authors 
risk a buy-out of their rights to the copyright 
industry. Domestic copyright laws in the EU, in 
particular, react to the problem in two different 
ways. Firstly, some of them try to strengthen 
the bargaining power of authors by providing 
for specific contractual protection.17 Secondly, 
some rights may be reserved for the adminis-
tration by collecting societies that make sure 
that authors actually receive a fair share of 
the income. In contrast, US FTAs combine, in a 
strange way, droit d’auteur and copyright con-
cepts by an obligation to protect for 70 years 
after the death of the author and a simulta-
neous requirement to make the copyright fully 
transferable.18 Free transfer breaks the link 
between the original author and transforms 
the “author’s right” into a proprietary right of 
the copyright industry. Still, the industry hap-
pily benefits from the longevity of the author 
who – or whose heirs – will receive nothing from 
the income generated by the extension of the 
term of protection. In addition, FTAs oblige the 
parties to ensure that the assignee fully enjoys 
the acquired right,19 which may well exclude the 
possibility that certain residual statutory rights 
are held back by domestic legislation for the 
original author and, consequently, may no longer 
be administered by collecting societies only. 
These FTA copyright rules favour those who 
invest in the acquisition of rights irrespective 
of whether such investment has any influence 
on the creative act of the original author. The 
economic effects may be extremely harmful 
to both the authors and the users. In some in-
stances, like in the area of scientific publishing, 
the authors and the users belong to the same 
group of people and both have to cope with the 
market power of dominant “copyright owners”, 
in this case the scientific and academic publish-
ers.20 The same rules produce a very negative 
effect on developing countries, be they in Latin 
America or Africa, where although local crea-
tivity produces music for the world market, it 
will almost certainly be controlled exclusively 
by multinational undertakings settled in the 
northern hemisphere.
d. Addressing issues of Abuse and  
balance under competition laws and 
the triPs Agreement
This paper has thus far argued in favour of an 
integrated concept of “intellectual property 
and competition law” on the domestic and 
international level. However, a competition-
policy oriented IP law alone cannot sufficiently 
address all competition problems that arise in 
the context of IPRs. Although IP statutes could 
generally be construed in a “pro-competitive” 
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way, courts may well make decisions that con-
tradict the competition-oriented approach.21 
Registration offices may grant rights that seri-
ously affect the openness of IP-related markets. 
Clauses in licensing agreements may restrict 
competition. De facto and de jure standardi-
sation,22 the latter based on network effects,23 
may exclude that market dominance based on 
IPRs can be contested by superior technology. 
Hence, even a competition-law oriented IP sys-
tem needs to be complemented by IP-related 
rules of competition law.
The current TRIPS Agreement only authorises 
WTO Members to apply their competition laws 
to IP-related cases.24 These TRIPS rules basically 
have two deficiencies. Firstly, they do not explain 
how to draw the line between permissible and il-
legal, i.e., anti-competitive use of IPRs. Whether 
international law could give more guidance at all 
at the moment is, however, quite doubtful since, 
with respect to the refusal to grant a licence in 
particular, single jurisdictions still demonstrate 
little certainty as to the most appropriate rules,25 
and considerable divergence exists between dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Secondly, current TRIPS 
rules only enable WTO Members to protect their 
own markets and therefore fail to establish an 
international regime that protects cross-border 
competition effectively against IP-related abus-
es. This is why even IP experts name competition 
law as the “single most important chapter to be 
written in the TRIPS Agreement”.26
ii.  iP And develoPment
As pointed out above,27 a competition-oriented 
international system does not require recogni-
tion of the same IP standards everywhere in 
the world. There are basically two arguments 
that explain why divergence can even be ben-
eficial.
The first argument relates to expansionist ten-
dencies in IP law. For instance, recent expan-
sion of US patent law to the areas of computer 
programmes and business methods alone does 
not advocate transferring such expansion to the 
international level. Since expansion of IP laws 
involves the risk of restraining competition, it 
is better to leave it to regulatory competition 
of different jurisdictions to find out whether, 
over time, expansion produces positive effects 
for innovation. For example, the US has always 
been hesitant to adopt the European model of 
protecting databases on the grounds of mere 
substantial investment.28 Today, it is the Euro-
pean Commission that questions its own policy 
of the 1990s and does not even exclude repeal-
ing the Database Directive of 1996.29
Whereas the first argument advocates more flex-
ibility for all domestic IP laws with respect to ex-
pansion of IP protection, we have to add a second 
argument, which supports, in particular, more 
flexibility for developing countries. From a com-
petition-policy perspective, one has to acknowl-
edge that IP-related markets are not necessarily 
global. Rejection of the principle of international 
exhaustion in many economically more advanced 
countries actually leads to a fragmentation of 
the world market. Again, global protection of 
IPRs in situations in which IP-related markets are 
not international only promotes the proprietary 
interests of the IP owners without sufficient jus-
tification in market economics.30
iii. governAnce oF iP mAtters
A. safeguarding objectivity and  
independence in dealing with the  
iP structure and industrial lobbies 
The current international system is highly inap-
propriate for the development of a framework 
that would lead to a more competition-orient-
ed IP system and which would protect such a 
system at the global level. This is basically due 
to the fact that some governments equate the 
interests of certain industries with their own 
national economic interests.
It has to be remembered that TRIPS is basically 
the result of a problem experienced by some 
economically more advanced countries in the 
1980s. Back then, the US, in particular, had to 
face an enormous trade deficit. Industries in 
the US had to respect domestic IP laws and of-
ten had to compete abroad with companies that 
were free to copy. Border measures could only 
combat importation of pirated and counterfeit 
goods. Therefore, TRIPS raised the standards 
of IP protection worldwide and promoted the 
enforcement of such rights in order to improve 
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the competitiveness of companies based in 
developed countries in global markets. Still, 
it does not necessarily appear that this policy 
has reduced the trade deficit of the US. Indeed, 
TRIPS has promoted globalisation. Intellectual 
property-related production and, increasingly, 
R&D, is moving to economically emerging coun-
tries, such as China and India. Technology-ori-
ented multinationals (e.g., Microsoft, Monsan-
to, pharmaceutical companies) may still have 
their headquarters in developed countries and 
continue to push governments there to promote 
ever higher and “proprietary” IP standards in-
ternationally. Whether such a policy will remain 
in the best interests of such developed coun-
tries, however, is questionable.
In addition, promoting ever higher standards of 
IP protection on an international level also has 
a negative impact on the domestic IP law of the 
more advanced countries. A detailed analysis of 
the IP rules of recent US FTAs would demon-
strate that the US does not only “export” US 
standards as they can be found in US statutes. 
These Agreements also create internationally 
binding obligations for the US, which can only 
be found in US case law and even oblige the US 
to raise their own domestic standards.31 From 
a domestic perspective, such expansion of do-
mestic protection via international law is prob-
lematic since it largely excludes democratic 
debate in national parliaments on whether such 
expansion should take place or not.
For interested industries, FTAs are therefore an 
ideal instrument to promote IP expansion both 
on the international and the domestic level. 
The more countries are bound by “TRIPS-plus” 
standards of bilateral FTAs, the more likely it 
becomes that these often “proprietary” stand-
ards will become the multilateral standards 
that replace the still recognisable pro-competi-
tive standards of the TRIPS Agreement. Like-
wise, FTAs promote “proprietary” expansion of 
domestic IP standards even in the US without 
sufficient democratic control.
b.  Possible initiatives for improving 
the existing system to respond to the 
needs of the 21st century
In light of the foregoing analysis, the outlook 
for future development of international IP law 
is not an optimistic one. Still, some recommen-
dations can be formulated to improve the cur-
rent situation:
1) The WTO system is in urgent need of 
a moratorium on the conclusion of IP-
related bilateral agreements. Free Trade 
Agreements, including IP-related provisions, 
tend to be highly anti-competitive. Under 
the TRIPS most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
obligation, those agreements do not only 
oblige the parties to such agreements 
to raise IP standards and to apply these 
standards to all WTO Members; they also 
create preferential treatment in the field 
of trade in goods and simultaneously 
put countries that refuse to accept such 
agreements at a competitive disadvantage. 
Countries that enter into FTAs with the US, 
for instance, gain facilitated access to the 
US market, whereas other countries have 
problems to compete in the US market. 
With the growth of the number of such 
FTAs, it becomes increasingly harder for 
the latter group of countries to resist the 
conclusion of similar FTAs;
2) The basic concept of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which relies on minimum standards, has to 
be reconsidered. There is an obvious need 
for the inclusion of maximum standards 
(ceilings) that guarantee that IP laws as 
such do not turn out to be anti-competitive 
and, thereby, hamper dynamic competition 
instead of promoting innovation and 
creativity;
3) Members of the WTO should work on 
more specific rules to control the anti-
competitive use of IPRs. Such standards 
could be recommended to WTO Members as 
domestic standards. In view of the need to 
protect cross-border competition against 
restraints related to IPRs, TRIPS could also 
include a rule that obliges WTO Members 
to apply their competition law without 
discriminating between the protection of 
domestic and international markets. Such a 
rule would promote transfer of technology 
to developing countries, in particular, 
since developed countries, as the better 
competition law enforcers, would have to 
prohibit, for instance, anti-competitive 
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clauses in licensing agreements of licensors 
based in their countries, although such 
agreements would only relate to the use 
of IPRs abroad.
The general philosophy of these few recom-
mendations relies on a concept of “dynam-
ic” competition as a global public good. At 
the WTO level, however, such a philosophy 
would require governments to look beyond 
acting as representatives of the interests of 
“domestic” industries and rather develop 
greater awareness of the common interest 
of all states in a global competition-oriented 
IP system. It may well be that, from an insti-
tutional perspective, such a “change of men-
tality” is easier to achieve in the framework 
of WIPO than the WTO.
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Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights” in Inter-
national Public Goods and Transfer of Technology. Maskus, 
K.E. and Reichman, J.H.  
31 One example for the latter is the inclusion of an obliga-
tion to respect the WIPO Joint Recommendation on the Pro-
tection of Well-Known Marks (1999). See, for instance, Art. 
16.1(2)(b)(i) US-Singapore FTA. On domestic US law, which 
seems more restrictive on protecting well-known marks 
from abroad, see 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
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intellectuAl ProPerty is one 
but not the only meAns to  
Promote innovAtion And  
creAtivity
Economists state that knowledge can be catego-
rised as a public good because it has the two ba-
sic and fundamental particularities that differen-
tiate public goods from private goods: non-rivalry 
and non-excludability. Knowledge is non-rivalrous 
since many people can enjoy it at the same time 
with no additional cost. It is also non-excludable 
because its enjoyment by one person does not 
exclude others from enjoying it too.
Economic analysis has highlighted the intrinsic 
problem that these two characteristics of pub-
lic goods may bring about with regard to the 
incentives to produce such goods. The standard 
argument is that the very nature of knowledge 
makes it particularly difficult to stop free-rid-
ers from enjoying the good without paying for 
it, thereby affecting the creator’s or producer’s 
ability to obtain an economic reward for the use 
of their work or production. As a consequence, 
the argument follows that there is little or no 
incentive to provide public goods privately and 
some of them could end up in short supply. 
Historically, governments have found two alter-
native paths to address this problem. One pos-
sibility was to finance the production and de-
livery of public goods either directly or through 
the granting of funds or subsidies to third par-
ties that would produce or deliver the goods. A 
second option was to modify this natural situ-
ation by bestowing artificial proprietary rights 
on public goods producers as a way of allowing 
them to exert some control over the use of their 
creations. Thus, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) provide one means to address the dilem-
ma of public goods appropriability by granting 
creators exclusive rights over the use of their 
creations and introducing an artificial scarcity 
that permits the generation of a market for in-
formation goods.
However, IPRs are neither the only nor neces-
sarily the most efficient means to promote in-
novation and creativity:
• Protection from imitation may result 
from several non-IPRs mechanisms, such 
as lead time, the innovator’s capacity to 
move on the learning curve quicker than 
competitors, the customer loyalty derived 
from superior sales and services, and from 
the very structure of the market;
• An important part of innovation takes place 
as a result of routine production activities 
and learning, completely unrelated to 
the existence of IPRs protection (e.g., 
agricultural innovation);
• Non-appropriation mechanisms, such as 
‘open source’ schemes, have proven to 
promote a vibrant process of innovation and 
are gaining importance in several areas;
• Information is both an output and an 
input in its production process; hence, the 
exclusionary rights conferred by IPRs can 
lead to under-utilisation of information, 
especially where cumulative forms of 
innovation prevail; 
• IPRs create a monopoly over information or 
the expression thereof, which may collide 
with certain fundamental social needs and 
individual rights, such as public health or 
the right to freedom of expression.
AdAPting iP regimes to socio-
economic circumstAnces
Different countries and sectors are affected dif-
ferently by IPRs. The static-dynamic efficiency 
rationale (the sacrifice of efficiency today in 
order to get innovations in the future) often ar-
ticulated to justify IPRs in developed countries, 
does not necessarily hold in countries with 
low scientific and technological capacity, lim-
ited capital to fund research and development 
(R&D), and a majority of people living with low 
income or in poverty. Obviously, the impact of 
any incentive crucially depends on the context 
in which it applies. While IPRs may not work 
as an incentive in a context of low level of de-
velopment, they may have significant negative 
allocative consequences and retard develop-
ment, for instance, by limiting access to medi-
cal treatment and education. 
Today, industrialised countries adapt their IPRs 
regimes to their different stages of economic 
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and technological development. This was made 
possible under a flexible international system 
of IPRs protection. After the adoption of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), developing countries did not 
have the same possibility. They are bound to 
apply standards of protection that may be suit-
able for advanced levels of development. The 
TRIPS Agreement has left, however, some areas 
of flexibility, for instance, in the definition of 
the concept of invention, the acceptance of 
parallel imports, the granting of compulsory 
licences, and in the provision, under certain 
conditions, of limited exceptions to exclusive 
rights. The Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public health recognised the 
existence of certain flexibilities in the Agree-
ment in November 2001.
However, these flexibilities may not be sufficient 
in certain contexts. This is why least developed 
countries (LDCs) are still exempted from the 
obligations of the Agreement. In addition, many 
developing countries have not made use of the 
permitted flexibilities often because of exter-
nal pressures, biased technical assistance or 
simply a lack of knowledge about their options. 
Moreover, recent Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
have substantially eroded such flexibilities, 
particularly in areas of interest that protect 
public health. A deliberated action is needed to 
preserve and expand the room countries have 
to pursue their national interests.
iP in the context oF  
develoPment 
The linkages between intellectual property and 
economic and social development are difficult 
to establish. In particular, it is extremely dif-
ficult to determine the causal relationship be-
tween certain levels of intellectual property 
protection and indicators of trade, investment, 
innovation, and technology transfer. Although 
several studies have explored the relationship 
between intellectual property and some of 
these variables, their results are far from be-
ing conclusive. Neither the economic theory 
nor the available evidence supports the current 
trend towards overprotection of IPRs. This is 
especially the case with the concept that “one 
size fits all”, namely, that high standards of IPRs 
protection are equally adequate for developed 
and developing countries. It seems clearly in-
correct to assume that to promote intellectual 
property is automatically to promote innovation 
and development and the more rights the bet-
ter. This is, however, the uncritical approach 
historically adopted by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). The proposed 
WIPO Development Agenda (WDA) offers an un-
paralleled opportunity to put on WIPO’s agenda 
the question of development as a central issue 
and to examine, in a rational and balanced way, 
both the benefits and costs of IPRs in different 
contexts. More importantly, the WDA stresses 
the need for WIPO to acknowledge that the pro-
motion of innovation and intellectual creativ-
ity cannot only be made through IPRs, and the 
need to discuss, for instance, matters relating 
to open collaborative models. 
The main challenge facing the WDA is some gov-
ernments’ reluctance to engage in an open and 
objective debate, to rely on evidence rather 
than ideology, and to recognise that even within 
their jurisdictions there is a growing scepticism 
about the functioning of the IPR system and 
concern about the impact of overprotection on 
the public.
imProving globAl  
governAnce oF iP
During the last 20 years, the international rules 
on IPRs have been essentially shaped by a small 
group of narrow industry interests, with little 
or no consideration of their likely implications 
on development and, particularly, on the poor. 
The role of the pharmaceutical, entertainment, 
software and semiconductor industries in influ-
encing the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement 
and, more recently, FTAs is well documented.1
WIPO’s institutional framework allows for both 
informal and formal intervention of various 
lawyers and business associations that openly 
promote the interests of particular industries 
and right holders, which also decisively influ-
ence in many cases the position of some gov-
ernments. In contrast, the current governance 
structure of IPRs allows for the limited partici-
pation of developing countries in decision-mak-
ing processes regarding the development and 
implementation of the IPRs system.  Often the 
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participation of developing countries in norm-
setting is distorted by expectations that they 
will obtain financial support in the context of 
WIPO’s technical co-operation programmes. A 
de-linkage of norm-setting and technical co-
operation could improve developing countries’ 
capacity to pursue their long term interests in 
WIPO’s decision-making processes. 
WIPO remains the main multilateral provider 
of technical assistance relating to intellectual 
property. Many developing countries and LDCs 
that received WIPO’s assistance have not taken 
advantage of the development-friendly policy 
spaces within the TRIPS. This raises concerns 
about the content of WIPO’s technical assist-
ance programmes. More transparency, espe-
cially regarding conflicts of interest of external 
consultants, and a development-sensitive ori-
entation of technical assistance are urgently 
required. The following principles may be sug-
gested for the supply of technical assistance:
• Development Focused Technical 
Cooperation: The provision of technical 
assistance should have as its objectives 
the fulfilment of the development goals 
of the recipient countries and broader 
development goals such as the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs);
• Comprehensive and Coherent Assistance 
Programmes: Technical cooperation 
should assist countries to devise coherent 
national IP policies that are linked to 
broader development and public policy 
objectives. The existence of such policies 
should be recognised as a necessary part 
of developing a coherent approach to the 
implementation of international IP-related 
commitments;
• Integrated Approach: In designing technical 
assistance programmes, there is a need to 
expand its coverage to include matters 
related to the use of competition law and 
policy to address abuses of intellectual 
property and practices that unduly restrain 
trade and the transfer and dissemination 
of technology; 
• Neutral, Unbiased and Non-Discriminatory: 
The provision of technical assistance should 
be unbiased, neutral and development-
focused. It should be of an advisory nature 
based on actual and expressed needs. The 
assistance should not discriminate among 
recipients or issues to be addressed and 
should not be perceived as being a reward 
system for supporting certain positions in 
international negotiations.  
In sum, the current governance of IPRs does not 
seem to be adequate to respond to the needs of 
the 21st century. The processes for the design 
of international rules need to ensure that the 
interests of the public in both developed and 
developing countries are taken into account. 
IPRs should be dealt with as one of the means 
to promote innovation and creativity. Any inter-
national organisation dealing with IPRs should 
work on and actively promote alternative 
mechanisms for the production of knowledge as 
a public good.
1 For instance, the US Trade Representative (USTR) Func-
tional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property (IFAC-3) 
(which has provided advice on the IPRs chapters of Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs)) is composed of representatives 
from the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), Eli Lilly 
and Company, the Intellectual Property Owners Association 
(IPO), the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC), 
the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), Levi 
Strauss & Co., Pfizer Inc., Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), Time Warner Inc., and The 
Gorlin Group.
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economic And PoliticAl  
considerAtions
A. developed economies
As traditional manufacturing moves to lower 
cost economies and new technologies assume 
greater importance in global economic trade, 
developed countries look to the intellectual 
property (IP) system to support businesses in 
levering economic value from creativity and 
encouraging greater investment in innovation. 
In doing so, a number of related issues arise. 
Firstly, businesses need to understand the na-
ture of IP, the goods that they have to exploit 
and ways of exploiting them. At the same time, 
the inventions made in university- and publicly-
funded research need to be brought to the mar-
ket place. Thus, training for businesses in both 
the use of IP and product and service devel-
opment become imperative as does the use of 
licensing for transferring technology between 
firms and between research and commerce. 
The exchange of information inherent in the 
patent system is also promoted as an innovation 
enabler, although problems arise in relation to 
research exemptions for patented processes 
and materials/devices.
Business is also concerned by the compliance 
cost of the IP system and looks to government 
for simplification and harmonisation, firstly in 
the regional setting (e.g., Europe) and then glo-
bally. In the global context, business also looks 
to robust IP enforcement regimes to protect 
investment and provide a predictable environ-
ment for joint ventures. 
Of course, government have other policy objec-
tives. Domestically, consumers look to limit the 
impact of monopolies on prices and availability 
and this leads to the development of competi-
tion policies and an increased role for compe-
tition authorities. At the same time, business 
looks for strong domestic enforcement regimes 
to prevent pirated and counterfeited goods af-
fecting the market.
In trade policies, governments are looking for 
markets for their companies and they will, 
thus, act to strengthen global IP systems, which 
ensure appropriate rates of return in trade.
b. developing countries
Developing countries need to take advantage 
of the shift of manufacturing from developed 
countries but also to grow their own capacity to 
innovate, either in improving existing products 
or in creating new ones. This causes a tension. 
Inward investors want IP regimes which prevent 
local companies from appropriating technology 
used in manufacturing. At the same time, host 
countries want room to support expansion of 
their own manufacturing and this often implies 
weakening the effectiveness of IP regimes. 
Often these countries do not have the infra-
structure to administer either the IP regime 
or the related competition, enforcement, and 
educational systems.  This tension seems to be 
the root of dissension at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).
Regarding least developed countries (LDCs), 
there is usually a complete lack of an effec-
tive infrastructure to support either IP systems 
or the emergence of a manufacturing economy 
without considerable external investment. The 
quick route, namely, piracy and counterfeiting, 
is seemingly an attractive option. But this very 
option then acts against the growth of legiti-
mate business and inward investment. In this 
context, developing countries are in danger of 
heading into a dead-end of illegitimate activity 
rather than expanding their potential for eco-
nomic growth.
iP And develoPment
The IP agenda has largely been driven by the 
developed countries seeking harmonisation, 
stronger regimes, and IP based trading agree-
ments. Governments of developed countries 
recognise that the world trading system and 
global stability require an increase in self-suf-
ficiency and economic strength in developing 
countries, both as markets and trading part-
ners.  However, IP offices have been slow to 
adapt their approach and are largely focused on 
the harmonisation and deepening agenda. This 
is partly because of the need to reach agree-
ment on the harmonisation debate that is be-
ing carried out amongst like-minded developed 
country groupings, and partly through frustra-
tion and distrust with the debate as conducted 
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by those promoting the development agenda. 
These arise from their imperative to protect 
the domestic manufacturing base. At the same 
time, developing countries mistrust the mo-
tives of developed countries that insist on fully-
fledged IP regimes within economies that are 
unable to benefit from them. 
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does al-
low tailoring but, without fundamental change 
in the trust between parties, the mechanisms 
for this will be hard to find. For example, al-
though the European Union (EU) has proposed 
a mechanism for access to medicine the whole 
issue of reverse imports is still far from settled. 
In other areas there is little or no agreement as 
to what would justify compulsory licensing if 
voluntary agreements were to fail. 
It is said that there is currently one size be-
ing made to fit all. The difficulties in solving 
harmonisation arguments between developed 
countries show that this is not wholly the case. 
The debate may prove sterile. Perhaps we 
should rather discuss where specific exceptions 
are called for when developing local IP systems, 
and the notion of impact assessments during 
both preparatory and delivery phases may be a 
way forward. This seems appropriate given the 
diverse range of circumstances across develop-
ing countries where few are completely alike. 
It looks ever more the case that few countries 
have the power to develop totally independent 
approaches. The world is much more closely 
connected than in the days when countries 
could with impunity switch their approach to 
IP on and off to suit their planned economic 
growth. 
This takes us straight to how the WIPO Develop-
ment Agenda (WDA) can be given substance. 
That it be given substance is imperative. We 
are unlikely to develop the most appropriate 
IP regime if we do so by means of trade-offs in 
trade talks, either bilaterally or at WTO.
governAnce oF iP mAtters
It cannot be persuasively argued that the exist-
ing architecture is fully fit for purpose. It is still 
too focused on the internalities of IP systems 
and does not integrate IP into commercial, in-
novation, social, and international policy. Too 
often, national offices are isolated from policy-
making, sometimes even in relation to IP, and 
cannot think broadly about IP. Where regional 
groupings exist there is tension between the 
operational function allocated to them and the 
need for a coherent regional approach to policy. 
This confusion between roles and competences 
weakens debating power and credibility.  
In addition, there is a lack of clarity of vision 
and of accountability in delivery at the interna-
tional level. This comes to the fore in relation 
to WIPO where programmes and objectives can 
overlap and contradict one another. Various in-
ternational bodies also address IP-related issues 
(e.g., the World Health Organization (WHO), 
United Nations Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (UNECE), and the Group of Eight (G8)), 
which can also lead to inconsistency, which in 
turn feeds mistrust.
The presence of conflicting and antagonistic 
lobby groups further complicates matters, es-
pecially as they often tend to work in differing 
areas. Each lobby group has a valid and distinct 
message, although that message may or not 
be in sympathy with governmental policy. The 
prime foundation for developing policy which 
reflects conflicting and competing interests 
must be at the political level – either national 
or regional, as only at this level is there a dem-
ocratic accountability to all. Debate must start 
there and be carried to international bodies 
based upon national competent decisions. All 
governments must listen to their industrial and 
commercial lobbies if they are to maintain the 
well-being of their economies and hence their 
citizens. But they must take a balanced view 
so that the benefits of IP supported innovation 
are shared within society. This is a difficult task 
requiring open and honest debate, open eyes 
about special interest, and open minds about 
compromise.
Regarding “technical assistance” this is all 
too often focused on technical issues such as 
building document collections, IT systems, and 
training IP staff. This is a valid and essential 
component, but more is needed. If we are to 
build capacity, we must take the broad view 
and develop an understanding of IP within local 
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business communities and societies, facilitate 
the development of the necessary infrastruc-
ture to maintain the position, and build com-
petition and legal regimes to control the whole 
process. This requires a comprehensive rethink 
in programme design and delivery. 
Such a rethink and its implementation will lead 
to a reassessment of the role of WIPO and we 
should take the opportunity to improve the gov-
ernance of the organisation and its relationship 
to Member States. This is not a quasi- technical 
notion of interest only to those with an eye for 
organisational process and structure; it is a sig-
nificant aspect of creating an organisation that 
can design and deliver effective programmes, 
can operate significant international systems, 
such as the Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT), 
the Madrid System for the International Regis-
tration of Marks (MADRID), and the Hague Sys-
tem for the International Registration of Indus-
trial Designs (Hague), as well as develop the IP 
norms appropriate to the digital age. 
In the short-term, the following seem priori-
ties:
a) Encourage the wider consideration of IP in 
the context of other policy objectives;
b) Identify and agree a subset of the issues 
on the current development agenda;
c) Agree the form and nature of development 
impact assessments;
d) Work through Programme and Budget and 
with the Audit Committee to improve 
decision-making and accountability within 
WIPO.
For its part the UK Government will be looking 
at its policies in the light of the Coalition for 
Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) and seeking 
partnerships to deliver those recommendations 
agreed by the Government.
NOTE: Since this paper was first written, the 
UK Government has published the independent 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (to be 
found at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk). The report 
highlights the importance of flexibility and 
balance within the IP system and, amongst its 
many recommendations relating to the whole 
field of IP, there are three of direct relevance 
to this paper:
A. Recommendation 5: The UK Patent Office 
(UKPO) should undertake joint work with Afri-
can Patent Offices from mid-2007 with the aim 
of: 
1) Helping them to take advantage of the 
flexibilities currently existing in the WTO/
TRIPS architecture, where appropriate; 
and
2) Encouraging them to make positive use 
of IP rights through dissemination of 
information in patents;
B. Recommendation 6: Encourage the inter-
national community under the auspices of the 
WTO to review the TRIPS status of the least 
developed countries prior to 2016 and consider 
whether further extension for reaching TRIPS 
compliance would be appropriate;
C. Recommendation 7: Government should 
encourage WTO Members to ratify the amend-
ments to TRIPS to make importation of drugs 
easier and cheaper.
The UK Government has accepted those recom-
mendations for which it is responsible and the 
UKPO (to be renamed the UK Intellectual Prop-
erty Office) is considering how to take these 
three recommendations forward.
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